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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
15788

DUNG HUNG VO I

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged on two counts with violations
of§ 78-3a-19, u.c.A., 1953asar.ended,inthat he willfully,
intentionally and unlawfully harbored a runaway minor and
did thereby cause that minor to become delinquent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was tried without a jury before
the Honorable Merrill Hermansen in the Third District
Juvenile Court for Utah County, State of Utah on one count
and was found guilty as charged on the 17th day of April,

l978.

The defendant plead guilty to the other count.

He
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was then sentenced to 90 days in the Utah County Jail under
cou~

a work-release program and a fine of $150.00 on each
or $300.00 in total.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's
verdict and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Becky Horton, a juvenile (R.5), ran away from
home on September 19, 19 77.

She went from Provo to Springvi:

to visit several friends and then travelled back to

Provo~

proceeded to appellant's apartment where she found a friend
named Cindy Graves (R.6-8).

The appellant, a Vietnamese

alien with limited English language ability, arrived three
or four hours later and greeted the girls by saying "hi" (L:
Both girls stayed at the apartment that night (R.11).
The next day Becky left the apartment for awhile
to visit with her boyfriend (R.11) and when she returned,
her friend Cindy was gone (R.14).

That evening, when the

appellant returned, he questioned Becky as to what she had
told her boyfriend and why she had run away from home (R.2J,.
He also told Becky that he had moved Cindy so that if one of
them got caught, the other would not (R.17).

Becky also

testified that she was never made to feel uncomfortable in
the apartment by the appellant (R. 24) although sexual advancr
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were made tm,1ards her by two other Vietnamese males in the
apartment when the appellant was not present (R.19, 20).
That night, Becky slept in the appellant's bedroom while
he moved into the other bedroom (R.18 and 30).
During the third day, Becky's father and the
police arrived at the apartment and found Becky hiding in
a bathroom closet (R.24 and 33).
POINT I
THE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST THE APPELLANT ALLOWED
A CONVICTION UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EITHER OF TWO
ALTERNATIVE SETS OF ELEMENTS.
Although the appellant was charged with a violation
of

§

78-3a-19, U.C.A. as amended 1953,

(T.2, 3) the various

subsections of that statute indicate alternative categories
of adults who may be tried by the juvenile courts for offenses
committed against children.

These subsections, therefore,

provide alternative routes by which a defendant may be
convicted.

The actions of the appellant are proscribed by

either subsection (1),
"Any person eighteen years of age
or over who induces, aids, or encourages
a child to violate any federal, state,
or local law or municipal ordinance, or
who tends to cause children to become or
remain delinquent, or who aids, contributes
to or becomes responsible for the neglect
or delinquency of any child;"
or subsection ( 3) ,
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"Any person eighteen years or over
who forcibly takes away a child from, or
encourages him to leave, the legal or
physical custody of any person, agency,
or institution in which the child has
been legally placed for the purpose of
care, support, education, or adoption,
or any person who knowingly detains or
harbors such child."
[Emphasis added.]
In the instant case, the pertinent elements under
subsection (1) are that the defendant;
1.

must be over age eighteen and

2.

induce, aid, or encourage a child to violate
the law or tend to cause children to become
or remain delinquent or aid, contribute to,
or become responsible for the neglect or
delinquency of an child;

or, under subsection (3); that the defendant
1.

must be over eighteen and

2.

knowingly

3.

detain or harbor a child who has left the
physical custody of those responsible for
him or her.
POINT II

THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE IN THIS CASE SHOULD ONLY
REQUIRE THAT THE STATE PROVE THE INJURY SPECIFIED IN THE
STATUTE OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF so~
PERSON.

-4-
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Some of the most damaging evidence with respect
to appellant's position in the lower court came out through
either re-statements of admissions made by the defendant
to a witness or through direct statements of the
appellant during the trial.

(See Memorandum of Findings

and Order, finding of fact No. 4 and R.17.)

Appellant

contends that the corpus delicti rule requires that proof
of his involvement in a crime must be introduced before
the court may consider any admissions of the appellant
himself.

1

Utah precedent and other authority, however,

would indicate that the rule is not nearly so broad.

1

It should be noted, at this point, that appellant
claims as error only the introduction of Becky Horton's
testimony to the effect that the appellant told her that
he was splitting her and her friend up so that both would
not be caught at the same time. Additional evidence was
presented through Miss Horton's testimony which demonstrates
the same knowledge element as will be discussed below.

Respondent feels obligated, however, in spite of
appellant's concession on pages 8 and 9 of his brief
that the State had proven the age element to note that
the appellant's majority was not establishad via evidence
independent from the appellant's own admissions.
It is
the respondent's contention, however, that neither proof
of knowledge nor appellant's majority is a required portion
of the corpus delicti in this case, even though they are
clearly elements of the crime, as noted above.
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The corpus delicti rule is stated in State v.
Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah, 1977).
"An admission or a confession,
without some independent corroborative
evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot
alone support a guilty verdict.
To
sustain a conviction, the requirement
of independent proof of the corpus
delicti requires only that the State
present evidence that the injury
specified in the crime occurred, and
that such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct."
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, however, points out that:
"For the preliminary purpose of
determining whether an extrajudicial
confession or admission is to be
allowed in evidence--or, putting it
another way, whether the corroboration
of an extrajudicial confession or
admission sufficient to support a
conviction is present, there must be
proof of the corpus delicti not beyond
a reasonable doubt, but rather the
evidence adduced need only tend to
show consistency with unlawfulness in
causing the injury in question." Charles
E. Torcia, wnarton Is Criminal Evidence,
13th Edition, Vol. I, § 17, p. 28.
Thus, the State does not have to prove the entire case beyor
a reasonable doubt before admitting any of the defendant's
admissions, but rather need only introduce evidence demonstrating the corpus delicti.
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition,

§

2072 further

explaines the purpose and extent of the corpus delicti

rule:

-6-
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.it warns us to be cautious
in convicting, since it may subsequently
appear that no one has sustained any loss
at all; for example, a man has disappeared,
but perhaps he may later re-appear alive."
(u.t p. 401.)
Wigmore then goes on to note that "to find that he is in truth
dead,

yet not by criminal violence . . • is not the discovery

against which the rule is designed to warn and protect us."
(at p. 401.)
In State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 158 A.2d 11 (1960),
a felony murder conviction, the court held that:
"The State was not required to
prove, independently of the defendants'
confessions, the fact that the shooting
occurred during the commission of a felony.
Of the three elements of murder, i.e. death,
criminal agency and the connection of the
defendants therewith, the State need independently prove only the first."
(at p. 19.)
See also State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964).
This reasoning is especially applicable in the instant
case.

Miss Horton testified that she had run away and was

allowed to hide within appellant's apartment (R.6-8,11,13).

This

is the harm against which the statute under which the appellant
was convicted is designed to protect.

Whether or not this harm

came about as a result of criminal conduct is not determined,
in this case, by the nature of the acts of the appellant, but
rather by the nature of the appellant himself.

The harm

to the minor, consisting of being helped to become or remain
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delinquent or of having been harbored and therefore aided
in remaining without the lawful and legal supervision and
care of her parents, would have occurred whether the appel]o
had been 16 or 32, given the same conduct on the part of
the appellant.

The State had demonstrated, before the

testimony of appellant as to his age or the testimony of
the police officer concerning appellant's admission of his
age, that the harm or injury had occurred.

This should

satisfy the requirements of the corpus delicti rule in this
case.
In addition, the court should take note of
several other unusual aspects of this case.
is a Vietnamese alien.

The appellant

As a result, foreign records as to

his birth are very difficult, if not impossible to obtain
from his homeland.

While the Federal Department of

Immigration and Naturalization may have some documents
similar to a birth certificate, they often do not and
their records contain, in many cases, nothing more than
admissions of immigrants as to their age.

Therefore, in

cases such as this, to require independent proof of a
defendant's age, when such proof may sim?lY not be avililabli,
could seriously hamper the processes of criminal justice
within the state.
Another important point is that the appellant
had, only a few months prior to this trial, been charged
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with a violation of this same statute before the same trial
judge.

(Note that there are two counts involved, appellant

plead guilty to one and appealed a conviction on the other.)
It was known to all participants that in spite of the lack
of independent evidence as to the appellant's age, he was
of majority.

Although defense counsel refused to stipulate

to his client's age, he does not challenge on appeal the
court's conclusion that appellant was over 18 years of age.
The State argues that the corpus delicti rule was
satisfied and that the conviction below should be upheld.
POINT III
THE

REM.~INING

ELEMENTS UNDER EITHER CONVICTION

ALTEENATIVE WERE ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE.
Although Utah does not have a statutory definition
of "delinquency" or of "contributing to the delinquency",
The Supreme Court has stated, in State v. Tritt, 23 U.2d
365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970) that:
"The terms 'delinquency' and
'contributing to the delinquency' as
applied to minors has for many decades
had such a widespread usage as to give
clear and understandable ~eaning that
it denotes actions that will aid, encourage or involve children in conduct
which is contrary to law, or which is
so contrary to the generally accepted
standards of decency and morality that
its result will be substantially harmful
to the mental, moral or physical wellbeing of the child."
(at 808, 809.)

-9-
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A child who has run away from home involves conduct which
could likely result in harm to the moral, if not physical
or mental well-being of the child.

In any event, to

foster and encourage a child's separation from his or her
home and parents through the provision of shelter and aid
in avoiding detection would certainly come within the above
definition of "contributing to the- delinquency" of a minor.
Although it is true, as appellant points out in
his brief on page 7, that the Juvenile Court may take
jurisdiction of a runaway child upon referral from the
Division of Family Services, whether or not that child can
be considered "delinquent" for the purposes of the prosecutii
of an adult under§ 78-3a-19, U.C.A., 1953 as amended,
determined by that fact.

is~

In other words, it has been

determined, in this state, that a child may become delinquen:
without committing any specific crimes and that encouragemen:
or aid to commit a crime is not a necessary element of
contributing to a child's delinquency.

See State v. Tritt,

supra.
In the instant case, Becky Horton, a minor, had
left her parent's home without permission and was hiding f«
her parents and the police when she was found (R. 3la).

Even

though she was never encouraged or asked to commit any speci'
crimes, she was delinquent and any help given to her in her
attempts to evade her parents and the police constitutes a
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contribution to her delinquency.

Thus, the remaining element

under subsection (1) was established.
Subsection (3) requires that the defendant knowingly
harbor a runaway minor.
While it is not clear whether or not the appellant
knew that Becky Horton was a runaway minor when he first
found her in his apartment,
why

she

the fact that he asked her

had run away on the second night clearly indicates

that he knew that she was a runaway (R. 28, 29).
Appellant cites State v. Macri, 28 U.2d 69, 498
P.2d 355 (1972) to demonstrate that the simple act of providing
shelter to a runaway does not constitute "harboring" under
§

78-3a-19(3).

That case can be distinguished from the present

case and is not determinative here.
In Macri, the appellant was operating an institution
whose prime purpose was to help alienated youth and people
involved with drug problems.

The minor involved in that

prosecution was one of many youths from many different areas
staying at that appellant's church.

The minor and her friend

in Macri also elected to return home and did so.

Here, no

particular positive function could be filled by Becky's
staying with the appellant.

There were never more than two

girls in the apartment and, as evidenced by the sexual
advances made by other residents of the apartment, the

-11-
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apartment was hardly a place where Becky's problems could
have been helped.

Becky did not elect to return home, but

instead, hid when the police and her father came looking for
her.

The facts are therefore distinguishable and although

the conduct of the appellant in MacE.i:_ in providing shelter
may not have been proscribed by the intent of the statute,
the actions of the appellant here should be.
Appellant also noted that no evidence as to the
ownership of the apartment was introduced.

He cited

State v. Davis, 16 Wash. App. 657, 558 P.2d 263 (1977) to
demonstrate the necessity of such proof.

The case can also

be factually distinguished in that while in that case the
defendant was merely found to be asleep in the same house,
the appellant here clearly moved out of his own bedroom to

By

allow Becky Horton and Cindy Graves a place to sleep.

acting as he did, the appellant in this case did knowingly
harbor Becky Horton, a runaway minor.
CONCLUSION
By proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-19,
1953 as amended, the State had the option of proving
the elements of subsection (1) or subsection

(3).

eith~

Althollgh

the only evidence clearly establishing the appellant's
knowledge and majority was his own statement, the nature of
the crime involved indicates that the State need not
necessarily prove age or knowledge as parts of the corpus
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delicti even though they are elements of the crime.

All of

the other elements of the crime were established via sufficient
evidence.

The State, therefore, urges the court to uphold

the conviction and sentence of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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